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1 Introduction
A basic principle of intellectual property law is that an idea (a piece of knowledge) cannot
be patented. Patents are limited to private goods. For example, a scientific report on
the principles used in the production of a new machine cannot be patented. The patent
protects only the template for the new machine. This principle, however, seems to be
challenged in many sectors such as the biotechnology and software industries. Nowadays,
databases, software, business plans, labeled as ‘knowledge-products’ by Quah (1997, 2001)
or ‘information goods’ by Scotchmer (2005) because their properties are akin to those of
knowledge (see below), are routinely protected by patents.
Section 2 describes this recent evolution in detail, but we can already give some ex-
amples where knowledge is directly traded and even protected by a patent. One is the
chemical industry. Innovations in this industry are mostly process innovations that get
largely licensed between firms (see for instance Arora and Fosfuri, 2000). The software
industry provides many other examples. For instance, IBM chose in the early eighties
to specialize on hardware development, licensing the characteristics of their PC plat-
form. More recently, software patents have started to be routinely granted. In 2002, it
was estimated that the United States Patent Office (USPTO) had granted more than
100,000 patents, and the European Patent Office (EPO) 30,000. In the biotechnology
sector, Scotchmer (1999) mentions Incyte, Human Genome Science and Celera, compa-
nies which sell access to their data-bases at millions of dollars per year per user. We can
further mention that Human Genome Science owns a patent on the gene that produces
the protein CCR5. Because of the existence of this patent, the researchers of the National
Institutes of Health had to buy a license to use the protein CCR5 as it enters in the
production process of a medicine for AIDS. Finally, in 1992, Agracetus, later bought by
Monsanto, was awarded a patent on a genetically modified cotton. The patent was later
extended to include all genetically modified cotton.
The notion that knowledge can be directly patented and exchanged on markets has
been developed and formalized for years by various authors such as Arrow (1962), Scotch-
mer (1991, 1999), Dasgupta et alii (1997), Gallini and Scotchmer (2003). However, this
notion did not find its way in endogenous growth literature (e.g. Romer, 1990; Grossman
and Helpman, 1991a; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Standard growth models consider in
effect that ideas are freely available and cannot be protected by intellectual property be-
cause only private goods embedding an idea can be. Although this is consistent with the
principles of intellectual property law mentioned above, it seems an inadequate formaliza-
tion in the case of new technologies. We can also argue that standard growth models do
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not account for the particular characteristics of the goods produced in the new technology
sectors. In the case of software, for example, pieces of knowledge are embedded in private
goods such as a CD-ROM or a DVD. On the face of it, this looks congruent with the
usual presentation used in growth models. However, that “private” good has an almost
nonexistent marginal cost of production. Therefore, it is akin to a public good and almost
consubstantial with the piece of knowledge itself. In other words, there is no intermediate
sector of private goods with a significant marginal cost of production.
In this context, the purpose of this paper is to develop a simple theoretical frame-
work that accounts for the recent evolution in intellectual property law. To get there, we
consider a simple growth model in which pieces of knowledge are directly protected by
patents. Formally, in this paper pieces of knowledge represent databases, software algo-
rithms or business plans. It can be discussed whether ideas will ever become patentable
by default. However, in several cases, ideas that are directly used are patented (business
models), and in others, there is no intermediate sector of private goods with a significant
marginal cost of production (software). It is therefore interesting to state the problem
as if the idea itself were patented directly. In any case, Scotchmer (2005) explains that,
in the case of information goods, the template is the information itself. That is, in the
new technology sectors at least, intellectual property rights directly protect knowledge.
Even if we don’t go as far as making the generalization that every idea is patentable, we
use in our formalization the following hypothesis for new technology sectors. That is, we
make the clear-cut assumption that the piece of knowledge and its storage device are fully
consubstantial and state the problem as if the piece of knowledge itself were patented
directly.
The primary challenge arising from this scenario is to specify the manner in which
the research is funded. We cannot in effect consider the standard equilibrium in which
a monopoly is granted to the firm producing the good embedding the new piece of
knowledge. Moreover, the public good property of knowledge (i.e. the non rival or
non-depletable good property according to the textbook definition, for instance that of
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995, ch. 11 or Scotchmer, 2005, ch. 2)1, raises two
kinds of well-known problems. First, standard problems of public economics arise such
as how to verify which agents use a piece of knowledge (verification problem) and how to
exclude agents that do not pay to use a piece of knowledge (exclusion problem). Then,
the second kind of problem we face is linked to the non convexity of technologies in which
knowledge is an input. Basically, the replication argument states that technologies display
constant returns to scale with respect to private inputs and increasing returns to scale
1Endogenous growth theory usually defines a public good as both non-rival and non-excludable.
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with respect to private and public factors taken jointly. In a competitive market, the
payment of private factors fully exhausts revenue and firms are thus unable to pay for
the public good they use (see e.g. Kaizuka, 1965; Sandmo, 1972; Manning et alii, 1985;
Feehan, 1989; Romer, 1990; Jones, 2003). Given this fundamental problem of existence,
we choose to construct a dynamic general equilibrium with Cournot competition and free
entry. Thereby, imperfect competition on private goods markets allows firms to get funds
to buy knowledge and research is privately funded.
Regarding the pieces of knowledge, we follow the standard literature in making the
simplifying assumption that they are perfect substitutes. However, our formalization
departs from the basic growth frameworks in that we consider the existence of a formal
market for knowledge. We assume that pieces of knowledge are exchanged on micro-
markets which work as standard competitive ones, except that there can be imperfect
verification and/or exclusion. Note that beyond the case of new technologies which is the
focus of this paper, we can also think of goods such as newspapers, books, movies and
TV-programs. These kinds of goods are indeed non-rival, differentiated, in some sense,
more or less substitutes and exchanged on markets that are almost perfectly competitive.
Formalizing the manner intellectual property law works in the new technology sectors
has important implications. Under the assumption of perfect verification and exclusion,
we show that the so-called distortion caused by the knowledge spill-over vanishes. This is
because all agents (including researchers) must pay the right to use the patented pieces
of knowledge (see e.g. examples cited above) and the markets of pieces of knowledge are
competitive. Ceteris paribus, innovators appropriate the entire amount of the surplus
they create which yields to an optimal research funding. Such desirable outcome seems,
however, difficult to get in the real world. Though there exists institutions or protection
systems such as encryption and copy controls in the case of softwares, innovators in the
new technology sectors may have difficulties to prevent illegal uses of their inventions
due to piracy for instance. We account for this feature in a simple way. We basically
assume that innovators appropriate only a share of the total surplus they create which
results in a reduction of research investments and to a lower level of growth in the long
run. The contribution here is to provide an alternative explanation to this kind of result
which finds empirical supports in the literature (see e.g. Jones and Williams, 1998). Here,
insufficient research investments arise in a complete market setting and relies on the non-
rival property of the pieces of knowledge, i.e. the problems of verification and exclusion. In
contrast, in the standard literature, this result arises in an incomplete market perspective
as pieces of knowledge are not priced. In standard settings, research is indeed indirectly
funded by the monopoly profits on private goods embedding knowledge. This has two
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consequences. First, the incompleteness of markets explains the intertemporal spill-over
distortion and second, monopolistic competition explains the appropriability effect which
appears to be the most driving force leading to under-investments in research (see e.g.
Jones and Williams, 2000).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the recent
evolution of intellectual property practice. Section 3 introduces the model. In Section 4,
we analyze the dynamic general equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.
2 Intellectual property law and its evolutions
Although intellectual property law still maintains the principle that ideas are not pro-
tected, its application has become more flexible in the past few years. Protection of
inventions and artworks is not a natural institution. In fact, though the institution is
old, it has been debated from the start, on moral as well as economic grounds. In the
18th century philosophers mostly opposed the extension of property rights to ideas.2 Who
could prevent an idea from spreading ? Who would ? Nothing should prevent the free
circulation of ideas and the general progress of human knowledge. Nevertheless, the ne-
cessity to protect inventors and authors quickly appeared. This necessity is based both
on moral grounds (every effort deserves a reward, every author should be protected, at
a time where plagiarism was rampant) and on practical ones (creation will be fostered
if it is profitable). Intellectual property law was devised with those two dimensions in
mind. Authors and inventors are to be protected and rewarded, and this reward is also an
incentive. It takes several forms, mainly copyright, patents and trademarks. The present
paper deals chiefly with patents.
The principle that ideas are not protected has always been a simplification. Actually,
some ideas have long been patentable. Patents can protect industrial processes, such
as a car’s blueprints or a new process to produce steel. Traditionally, patent offices
distinguished between ideas (non patentable) and industrial processes (patentable, though
they could be considered as ideas too). European jurisprudence drew the line at the
2Lawyers often quote Jefferson, in a letter from 1813: If nature has made any one thing less susceptible
than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an
individual may exclusively possess as long as she keeps it to herself ; but the moment it is divulged,
it forces itself into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess herself of it. Justice
Douglas also states, in a Supreme Court decision from 1950: It was never the object of those laws to
grant a monopoly for every trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would naturally and
spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of manufactures(The
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. vs. Supermarket Corp.).
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“technical” character of an idea. This distinction was considered meaningful because these
processes or blueprints are not directly used in the final sector: a private good embeds
the idea. The standard way that growth models consider research effectively regards
patentable “ideas” as few. They are supposed never to be used by themselves but to be
embedded in a private good, a simplification reflecting the way patent law used to work.
However, even if the principles of the law have not changed, more ideas are considered
patentable today. The standard simplification, even if it still complies with the principles
of intellectual property law, is thus further from practical reality. With the rise of new
technology industries and their high knowledge content, what could have been interpreted
as exceptions in the past tends to become the rule. That is, intellectual property law has
changed, so that the theoretical treatment (in endogenous growth literature) does not
even reflect law as it exists today.
The main example of this evolution is the software industry. Software was originally
deemed a non-technical idea, similar to a mathematical theorem. Its expression could be
copyrighted, but software innovations could not be patented. In Europe, article 52.2 of
the Munich convention explicitly states that software is not patentable. In the US, the
US Patent Office was reluctant to grant any software-related patent, with the justification
that mathematical truths are not patentable (it was following the 1972 decisionGottschalk
vs Benson in which the Supreme Court considered that software was nothing more than
a mathematical algorithm). Copyright was the only relevant protection: it is not possible
to copy the expression of a software, but it is possible to copy its functions and concepts.
The first sign of an evolution was the decision Diamond vs Diehr in 1981. The Supreme
Court authorized a patent on an innovation (a new method to produce rubber) that
made explicit use of a software component. A patent had been granted because that
software had a tangible effect.3 Jurisprudence became gradually more flexible on what
constituted a patentable software-related innovation. In 1998, the Federal Circuit Appeal
Court decided, in the case State Street Bank & Trust Co. vs Signature Financial Group,
3The line was defined as follows: We view respondents claims as nothing more than a process for
molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula. We recognize,
of course, that when a claim recites a mathematical formula (or scientific principle or phenomenon of
nature), an inquiry must be made into whether the claim is seeking patent protection for that formula
in the abstract.(...) To hold otherwise would allow a competent draftsman to evade the recognized
limitations on the type of subject matter eligible for patent protection. On the other hand, when a claim
containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which,
when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g.,
transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements
of section 101.
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Inc., that any software, and even a mere mathematical algorithm, could be patented,
which seems the final point in this evolution.
A similar evolution took place in Japan. Europe long maintained the interdiction to
patent a software. An evolution is visible, though. Since 1996, the EPO has started
granting patents where the tangible industrial process is more and more remote.4 In
practice, many software programs are now patented. The Munich convention was meant
to be reformed in 2000 to allow this evolution, but the member-states (among which there
are also some non-European Union members) chose to rely on a decision by the European
Union. In 2002, the commission proposed a directive that would have allowed software
patents. After a lengthy discussion in the European Parliament, software patents remain
forbidden for now.
The extension of what is patentable is not limited to software. In the US, business
models are now routinely patented. For example, the idea to keep information about on-
line clients from one visit to another to facilitate their shopping is patented by Amazon.5
This patent is not only a threat. It has real effects: Barnes & Noble had to change their
on-line shopping service so as not to infringe on the Amazon patent. Priceline.com should
also be mentioned, with its patent on the use of reversed auctions.6 In line with these
evolutions of new technology sectors, in our model, new pieces of knowledge are directly
protected by patents.
3 Model
To formalize the ideas developed in Introduction and in Section 2, we develop a simple
endogenous growth model with horizontal differentiation in the line of Grossman and
Helpman (1991b, ch. 3), Smulders and Van de Klundert (1995, 1997), Peretto (1996,
1998, 1999). We augment these analyses, however, in considering a market for knowledge.
Time, denoted by t, is continuous and goes from zero to infinity. There are three
kinds of goods. At each instant, differentiated goods, denoted by Xjt, are produced by
an exogenous number of sectors denoted by j (j = 1, . . . , N), each one comprising Qjt
firms (qj = 1, . . . , Qjt), where Qjt is endogenous. At every point in time, a continuum of
pieces of knowledge [0, At], where At denotes the total stock of knowledge, is produced and
expanding through R&D activities. A piece of knowledge is an indivisible, infinitely-lived,
4For instance, patent EP0800142 on the 8th of October 1997 deals with a method to convert file names
from the Windows 95 to the Windows NT format.
5One-click patent (5,960,411, 28th September 1999).
6Patent 5,794,207, 11th august 1998.
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differentiated and non-rival good. It can be a scientific report, a database, or a software
algorithm. Although pieces of knowledge are differentiated goods, for simplicity we will
treat them as perfect substitutes. That is, we can sum any intervals of the set [0, At].
Finally, at each instant, there is a fixed quantity of labor, denoted by L, which is owned
by individuals as initial endowment.
To simplify the analysis and as we can find such behavior in the pharmaceutical,
software or aeronautics industries, we assume that in each sector j every firm qj engages
simultaneously in the production of differentiated good j and in research. Denoting
by Xqjt the quantity of differentiated good produced by firm qj, the total quantity of
differentiated good j is given by Xjt =
PQjt
qj=1Xqjt. Similarly, denoting by Aqjt the stock
of knowledge produced by firm qj until date t, the quantity of knowledge produced in sector
j is Ajt =
PQjt
qj=1Aqjt, and the total stock of knowledge is given by At =
PN
j=1
PQjt
qj=1Aqjt.
Technologies and preferences are described as follows.
At each instant, firm qj produces a quantity Xqjt of differentiated good j, along with
Xqjt = γ
¡
Aqjt
¢ν
LXqjt, (1)
where γ > 0, 0 < ν < 1, LXqjt is the quantity of labor devoted to the production of
differentiated good qj and A
qj
t is the stock of knowledge used by firm qj, with A
qj
t ≤ At.
Two comments are in order here. First, there is no reason to assume that firms use the
whole stock of knowledge, At, a feature embodied in (1) and (2) below. We will see in
Section 4 that such specification also facilitates the distinction between supply side and
demand side when we analyze the market for knowledge. Second, technology (1) captures
in a simple way the arguments on new technologies developed in Introduction and in
Section 2. We assume in effect that the storage device is fully consubstantial with the
piece of knowledge and thus we do not specify any intermediate goods sector embedding
knowledge.7 It results that we cannot study the usual equilibrium in which research is
funded by the monopoly profits on intermediate goods. Jones (2002, 2003) also develops
models that do not incorporate any intermediate goods, i.e. he specifies technologies for
output which are similar to (1). In his 2002 paper, he explains that such formalization
“can be viewed as a precursor to the richer analysis that comes from adding markets to the
model and analyzing equilibrium conditions” (pp. 223). In his 2003 paper, he constructs
an equilibrium in which research is publicly funded. Although this strategy solves the
problem of non-convexity discussed in Introduction, there is no specific market and thus
7For comparison, the equivalent technology of (1) used in standard growth models would be Xqjt =
γ
³
LXqjt
´α R Aqjt
0
£
zqjt(h)
¤1−α
dh,where 0 < α < 1 and zqjt(h) would be the quantity of intermediate good
h which embeds the specific piece of knowledge h, h ∈ [0, Aqjt ].
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no specific price for knowledge. Therefore, characterizing an equilibrium in which there is
a specific market and a specific price for knowledge in which research is privately funded
as well as answering to a question raised by the author are another contribution of this
paper.
The R&D-technology of each firm qj is given by
•
Aqjt = δL
A
qjtA
qj
t , (2)
where δ > 0 and LAqjt is the amount of labor devoted to research in firm qj. It is possible
to argue that there is evidence of diminishing returns in R&D because the redundancy
and overlap in research reduce the total number of pieces of knowledge produced by a
researcher (see e.g. Jones, 1995). Similarly, it could be interesting to investigate a model
including creative destruction effects like Jones and Williams (2000). Finally, to avoid
the well-known problems of scale effects resulting from the specification of the R&D
technology (2), we could for example introduce endogenous human capital accumulation
(see e.g. Arnold, 1998) or specify a model in the spirit of Howitt (1999) with both vertical
and horizontal differentiation. As shown by Grimaud and Rouge (2004, 2008), Grimaud
and Tournemaine (2006, 2007) who account for various of the above features in models
close to ours, we would complicate but not alter the main insight of the paper. In that
sense, the model presented here and more specifically technology (2) must be viewed as
the choice of simplicity over complexity. This will allow us to focus on the key feature of
the problem tackled in Section 4 (i.e. funding research privately when pieces of knowledge
are directly protected by patents) and to obtain simple closed form solutions.
The economy is populated by L identical individuals. Each one of them is endowed
with one unit of labor that she supplies inelastically. Preferences of the representative
individual are given by
U =
Z ∞
0
hPN
j=1 (cjt)
ε
i(1−θ)/ε
− 1
1− θ e
−ρtdt, (3)
where 0 < ε < 1, cjt is the consumption of differentiated good j, ρ > 0 is the rate of time
preference and θ is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution with θ > 0 and θ 6= 1.
Since differentiated goods are used for consumption only, we have
Lcjt = Xjt ∀j = 1, ..., N. (4)
Finally, the labor constraint writes
L = LXt + L
A
t , (5)
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where LXt =
PN
j=1
PQjt
qj=1 L
X
qjt and L
A
t =
PN
j=1
PQjt
qj=1 L
A
qjt denote the aggregate quantities
of labor employed in the production of differentiated goods and research, respectively.
4 Dynamic general equilibrium
4.1 Basic assumptions and market for knowledge
The purpose of this Section is to characterize an equilibrium in which pieces of knowledge
are exchanged on a market. As explained in Introduction, this rises two kinds of problems.
First, if we assume perfect competition on the markets of consumption goods, a general
competitive equilibrium does not exist due to the property of constant returns to scale
with respect to labor in the production of differentiated goods (1) and knowledge (2).
To settle this problem of existence, we assume imperfect competition on differentiated
consumption goods markets. More precisely, we assume Cournot competition with free
entry on the market of each good j, and will denote by pjt the price of differentiated good
j, j = 1, ..., N .8
Second, we must formalize how pieces of knowledge are exchanged. As is standard in
growth literature, we assume that once a firm produces a piece of knowledge, it is granted
an infinitely-lived intellectual property right, akin to an infinite patent. The firm which
owns a patent on a piece of knowledge uses it for her own production and sells licenses
to others. For simplicity, we assume that pieces of knowledge are rented to the users,
though a selling market would be equivalent. To deal with the difficulties arising from the
non-rivalry property of knowledge (verification and exclusion problems), we assume that
firms cannot arbitrate, i.e. they cannot resell, re-rent, copy or share a piece of knowledge
to or with other firms.9 Thus, each firm can be considered as an independent market
from the point of view of the sellers of knowledge: at each moment there are
PN
j=1Qjt
micro-markets for knowledge and on each micro-market, each firm qj is characterized by
an instantaneous marginal willingness to pay vqj(A
qj
t ) (see equation (10) for the analytical
expression of this function).
As explained before, the goods exchanged here (i.e. the pieces of knowledge) are
non-rival and differentiated. Moreover, they enter in technologies (1) and (2) as perfect
substitutes. This implies that the ranking of pieces of knowledge is irrelevant inside the
8Bertrand competition cannot be used here because in each sector j there is a single homogenous
good.
9In Section 4.4, we will relax the assumption of perfect verification and perfect exclusion and analyze
how it modifies the equilibrium solutions.
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set [0, At]. To take into account the problem of substitutability, we assume that the sellers
of knowledge have no market-power. This means that each micro-market works as a
standard competitive market for an homogeneous good, and thus there is no problem of
information because the willingness to pay of the buyers to use a piece of knowledge is
revealed by the market mechanism.
In analyzing how the market for knowledge works, we must distinguish between the
price paid by each firm for one piece of knowledge and the price perceived for this piece by
the seller. As knowledge is non-rival, the price perceived is equal to the sum of the prices
paid by all buyers. Formally, we denote by vqjt the price of a piece of knowledge on the
micro-market qj. Since the willingness to pay of firm qj is vqj(A
qj
t ), the demand function
is v−1qj (vqjt). At each moment, the firm faces the total supply At, i.e. at each moment the
total supply is inelastic. Thus, in equilibrium, the price vqjt is solution of v
−1
qj (vqjt) = At,
that yields vqjt = vqj(At) for all qj. This means that in equilibrium the rental price of a
piece of knowledge adjusts so that each firm uses effectively the total stock of knowledge:
Aqjt = At. Since vt is a rental price, the value of a piece of knowledge, Vt, is given by
Vt =
R∞
t vse
−
R s
t
rududs, where ru is the interest rate of the perfectly competitive financial
market. Let us note that different firms generally pay different rental prices for a piece of
knowledge, vqjt, which is a standard practice in the biotechnology sector, pharmaceutical
or software industries. However, the total price perceived by a seller, vt, is the same for
any piece because the aggregate marginal productivities of each piece of knowledge are
the same. We can recapitulate the main features regarding how the knowledge market
works as follows:
Proposition 1 : In equilibrium, under the assumption that pieces of knowledge are ex-
changed on perfectly competitive micro-markets:
a) each firm qj uses the whole stock of knowledge: A
qj
t = At;
b) the price of a piece of knowledge at any moment t is given by the marginal willingness
to pay: vqjt = vqj(At);
c) the price perceived by a firm for the renting of a piece of knowledge at any moment t
is given by vt =
PN
j=1
PQjt
qj=1 vqjt;
d) the value of a piece of knowledge is given by Vt =
R∞
t vse
−
R s
t
rududs.
Before turning to the formal characterization of the equilibrium, let us mention that
we assume perfect competition on the labor market and we normalize the price of labor
to one: wt = 1.Moreover, for more clarity, we shall find it convenient to give the following
Definition of the equilibrium with Cournot competition and free entry in which pieces of
knowledge are directly patented:
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Definition 1 : An equilibrium is a set of profiles of number of firms ({Qjt}, j = 1, ..., N),
of quantities of goods ({cjt}, j = 1, ..., N, {Xqjt}, {LXqjt}, {LAqjt}, {Aqjt}, {A
qj
t }, qj =
1, ..., Qjt, j = 1, ..., N), and of prices ({pjt}, j = 1, ..., N , {vqjt}, qj = 1, ..., Qjt, j =
1, ..., N, {vt}, {Vt}, {rt}) such that:
- the labor market and the financial market are perfectly competitive;
- on each differentiated good market, there is Cournot competition with free entry;
- each firm rents knowledge on an independent micro-market which works as a perfectly
competitive one;
- the representative individual maximizes her utility and firms maximize their profits.
4.2 Characterization of the equilibrium
The representative individual maximizes (3) subject to the budget constraint
•
bt = rtbt +
wt−
PN
j=1 pjtcjt, where bt ≡ AtVt/L is the per-capita stock of wealth (recall that wt is equal
to one). The solution of this program is standard. The individual’s demand function for
each consumption good j is cjt = Et (pjt)
1/(ε−1) , whereEt =
PN
k=1 pktckt/
PN
k=1 (pkt)
ε/(ε−1) .
Using (4), we get the inverse demand function for differentiated good j:
pjt = (LEt)
1−ε
⎛
⎝
QjtX
qj=1
Xqjt
⎞
⎠
ε−1
. (6)
The Keynes-Ramsey rule is:
rt = (1− ε)gcjt + [1−
(1− θ)
ε
]gΩt + ρ+ gpjt, (7)
where gΩt is the growth rate of
PN
j=1 (cjt)
ε .
Firms have two activities: 1) each one produces and sells a differentiated good on an
imperfect market (competition à la Cournot); 2) simultaneously, each one produces and
rents new pieces of knowledge. Each firm qj maximizes the sum of the present values of
expected profits
πqj0 =
∞R
0
[pjtXqjt − LXqjt + vtAqjt − L
A
qjt − vqjtA
qj
t ]e
−
R t
0
rududt,
subject to Xqjt = γ
¡
Aqjt
¢ν
LXqjt (see equation (1)),
•
Aqjt = δL
A
qjtA
qj
t (see equation (2))
and the inverse demand function pjt = (LEt)
1−ε (
PQjt
qj=1Xqjt)
ε−1 (see equation (6)). After
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substitution, the Hamiltonian of this problem is
Ht =
⎧
⎨
⎩Xqjt
⎡
⎣(LEt)1−ε (
QjtX
qj=1
Xqjt)
ε−1 −
¡
Aqjt
¢−ν
/γ
⎤
⎦+ vtAqjt − LAqjt − vqjtA
qj
t
⎫
⎬
⎭ e
−
R t
0
rudu
+ξtδL
A
qjtA
qj
t ,
where ξt is the co-state variable associated with (2). In this problem, the choice variables
are Xqjt (production of differentiated good), L
A
qjt (quantity of labor employed in research),
Aqjt (quantity of knowledge to be used in the production processes) and Aqjt (the quantity
of knowledge to be produced). The first order conditions are ∂Ht/∂Xqjt = 0, ∂Ht/∂L
A
qjt =
0, ∂Ht/∂A
qj
t = 0, ∂Ht/∂Aqjt = −
•
ξt, and the transversality condition stating that the value
of a firm’s qj stock of knowledge is zero at the end of the planning horizon is given by:
lim
t→∞
ξtAqjt = 0.
After computations described in Appendix, we get:
Xjt = LEt
½
γ
¡
Aqjt
¢ν ∙
1 + (ε− 1)
Xqjt
Xjt
¸¾1/(1−ε)
, (8)
VtδA
qj
t = 1, (9)
vqjt =
(νLXqjt + L
A
qjt)
Aqjt
. (10)
Equation (8) implicitly yields the best response of firm qj, Xqjt, to the choice of production
of differentiated good j of the others. Equation (9) states that the value of one piece of
knowledge, Vt, is equal to the marginal cost. Indeed, from (2) we get LAqjt/
•
Aqjt = 1/δA
qj
t
which is the marginal cost since the wage is normalized to one. Finally, equation (10)
gives the willingness to pay, vqj(A
qj
t ), that we have used in Section 4.1 to analyze how the
market for knowledge works. It is composed of two parts. The first one, νLXqjt/A
qj
t , can
be interpreted as the willingness to pay at date t to use a piece of knowledge at t for the
production of the differentiated good; the second one, LAqjt/A
qj
t , is the willingness to pay
to use a piece of knowledge at date t in order to make research at t. We thus have here
an analytical representation of the public good (non-rival) nature of knowledge inside the
firm: each unit of knowledge is used twice by each firm. Note that this expression has
another interpretation. That is, innovators are directly rewarded by any kind of agent
using their knowledge: here, producers of differentiated goods and researchers. This kind
of interpretation differs from the one we have in the standard R&D-based literature where
13
researchers have a free access to the stock of knowledge. We will come back in more details
on this important point in Section 4.3 where it is more appropriate. To pre-amble, this
result comes from the fact that knowledge is directly patented and priced in our model,
i.e. this is the outcome of the formalization of new practices of intellectual property law
regarding the new technology sectors.
4.3 Symmetric equilibrium
In order to get simple solutions, from now on we assume that all firms are identical, i.e.
we focus on a symmetric equilibrium, and we assume that the number of firms in each
sector, Qjt, is a continuous variable. A symmetric equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 2 : A symmetric equilibrium is characterized by a number of firms in each
sector j, quantities and prices that are identical for all qj and for all j: Qjt = Qt for all
j, Xqjt = Xjt/Qt = Xt/Qt, L
X
qjt = L
X
jt/Qt = L
X
t / (NQt) , L
A
qjt = L
A
jt/Qt = L
A
t / (NQt) ,
Aqjt = Ajt/Qt = At/ (NQt) , for all qj and for all j; pjt = pt for all j.
As shown in Appendix, manipulation of (1)-(10) along with Proposition 1 and Defin-
ition 2 leads to Proposition 2 below which the summarizes the results we get at steady-
state. For convenience, time subscripts are dropped when variables are constant, but kept
for individual, perpetually growing, variables.
Proposition 2 : The steady-state symmetric dynamic general equilibrium with Cournot
competition and free entry is characterized by a set of quantities, prices, growth rates and
a number of firms in each sector j, j = 1, ..., N , that take the following values:
Quantities:
LA =
δνL− ρ
δνθ
, LX =
δνL(θ − 1) + ρ
δνθ
, Lct = Xt =
γ (At)
ν LX
N
, At = A0 exp{gAt}.
Prices:
pt =
µ
L
LX
¶µ
1
γ(At)ν
¶
, vt =
(νLX + LA)
At
, Vt =
1
δAt
, r =
δνL(θ − 1) + ρ
θ
Growth rates of quantities:
gLA = gLX = 0, gc = gX =
δνL− ρ
θ
, gA =
δνL− ρ
νθ
.
Growth rates of prices:
gp = −νgA, gv = gV = −gA, gr = 0.
14
Number of firms in each sector:
Q =
νδθL (1− ε)
νδL− ρ .
Proof. : See Appendix.
Comments are in order here. Although the number of firms is endogenous, there are
no transitional dynamics in the symmetric equilibrium. The reason is that there is no
fixed or sunk cost of entry and exit for the firms (see e.g. Peretto, 1996). Thus, the
number of firms in each sector, Q, is a jump variable. Existence of such steady-state
requires νδL− ρ > 0 implying gA > 0 and Q > 0 because ε < 1.
Examination of Proposition 2 shows that the results we get are very simple. Basically,
the dynamic properties of the model are close to that of a basic R&D-based model, except
that our framework is characterized by an expanding variety of pieces of knowledge and
not of products (see e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991b, ch. 3 and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995, ch. 6). Thus, we refrain from conducting comparative statics because it
would not add any new insight.
However, the kind of equilibrium depicted here is very different. Beyond the fact
that we do not specify any intermediate goods production sector embedding new knowl-
edge, which not only fits with the case of new technologies but also has the appealing
property to simplify the analysis, the kind of equilibrium we have characterized displays
complete markets. From a technical point of view, we can indeed argue that the basic
R&D literature does not solve the non-convexity problem raised by the non-rival prop-
erty of knowledge through the introduction of imperfect competition (monopoly on the
sale of intermediates embedding knowledge), but through an implicit incomplete market
assumption: pieces of knowledge are not directly priced.
We can get a more intuitive interpretation of this feature if we examine the expression
giving the price of a piece of knowledge at each moment, vt. This expression is repeated
below for convenience (see Proposition 2):
vt =
(νLX + LA)
At
. (11)
Similarly to what we mentioned, we can interpret νLX/At and LA/At as the aggregate
willingness to pay at date t to use a piece of knowledge at t for the production of differen-
tiated goods and knowledge, respectively. The interesting point about the instantaneous
value of a piece of knowledge given by (11) is that it differs from the expression generally
obtained in the standard literature on growth (see e.g. Jones and Williams, 2000). As
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noted by Grimaud and Tournemaine (2006), the equilibrium value of a piece of knowl-
edge considered in standard growth models consists in a fraction of the first term, νLX/At,
which comes from the monopoly profits on intermediate goods. The second term, LA/At,
does not appear because of the incomplete market assumption: researchers do not take
into account that the knowledge they produce can be used to make new pieces of knowl-
edge (intertemporal spill-over effect): this is because knowledge is free of charge. This
implicit assumption of incompleteness results from the formalization of how intellectual
property law worked prior to the recent evolution that followed the emergence of new
technologies. However, as argued in Introduction and in Section 2, such formalization
is at odds with the recent practices in the new technology sectors. As mentioned, since
knowledge is directly patented, both researchers and producers of homogenous goods must
pay the right to use the pieces of knowledge. This feature is clearly taken into account
in equation (11). Therefore, in the present framework, researchers take into account that
the knowledge they produce can be used to make new knowledge. Furthermore, since
the micro-markets of knowledge are competitive, and there is no problem of verification
and/or exclusion, each piece of knowledge is funded at its optimal level, i.e. the sum of
the Lindahl prices. To summarize, we have:
Proposition 3 : Under the assumption that there are micro-markets for knowledge, that
these markets are perfectly competitive and that there is perfect verification and exclusion:
a) knowledge does not cause any external effect;
b) knowledge is optimally funded.
This proposition has an important implication. It establishes that in formalizing the
evolution of intellectual property law regarding the knowledge produced in new technology
sectors, the model displays only one distortion: Cournot competition on differentiated
goods markets. The departure from the competitive market structure is necessary to fund
research and sustain long term economic growth. That is, it allows firms to fund the
payment of knowledge, despite the standard assumption of constant returns to scale with
respect to labor (the only private input here) in technologies (1) and (2).
Let us illustrate this argument with an example. Let us assume that the objective of a
policy-maker is to increase competition on differentiated goods markets. From Proposition
2, the price of differentiated goods, pt, is higher than the marginal cost of production given
by 1/(γ(At)ν). We have: pt = m/ (γ(At)ν) with m = L/LX > 1. Interestingly, the term
L/LX represents an indicator of the degree of competition on the markets of differentiated
goods: as L/LX approaches one, markets are more competitive. Thus, to achieve her goal,
the policy-maker can for example introduce a subsidy-policy on the quantity of labor,
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LX . To avoid other distortionary effects, the policy-maker collects lump-sum taxes from
individuals and has a balanced budget at any moment. When the subsidy is introduced,
LX increases. It results a reduction of the price of differentiated goods, pt, and an increase
of the number of firms in each sector, Q (see equation (23) given in Appendix). Ceteris
paribus there is a dilution of profits realized on differentiated goods. Since firms have
less funds to buy knowledge, they reduce the quantity of resources they allocate to make
research. This effect is captured in a simple way by the model. Firms reallocate labor
one for one between the production of differentiated goods and research. This is because
we have L = LX + LA at each moment. As a consequence, the level of growth is lower.
To summarize, we can state:
Proposition 4 : More competition on differentiated goods markets leads to a dilution of
economic profits, then to a reduction of investments in R&D and a lower level of growth.
Before closing this Section, we must mention that in the particular model developed
in this paper, the dynamic general equilibrium with Cournot competition and free entry
leads to an optimal allocation of labor across the differentiated goods production sector
and the research activity. The same type of result had been obtained by Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995, ch. 6, Section 2) in a model with an expanding variety of consumer
products. In the present paper, three reasons explain this particular result. First, the
Cournot competition leads to a price for differentiated goods which is non-optimal (it is
above the marginal cost of production). However, because of the property of symmetry,
the relative prices of goods themselves are not affected by imperfect competition. Second,
as labor supply is inelastic, it is unresponsive to wage changes. Third, knowledge is
optimally funded. In the next sub-section, we will see that the equilibrium is no longer
optimal when knowledge is not funded optimally.
4.4 Introducing verification and exclusion problems
In this sub-section, we attempt to formalize in a simple way the problems of verification
and exclusion encountered by sellers of pieces of knowledge. It should be mentioned that
intellectual property institutions, chiefly patent offices, attempt to solve some of these
problems. They try to check that a new piece of knowledge seeking protection is indeed
different from the state of the art and previous patents, comes from an inventive activity
and can have an industrial application. When a researcher wants to obtain a patent she
must give all the references she has used to produce the new piece of knowledge. Legal
firms which buy and/or manage patents without performing R&D themselves also exist in
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the US. These firms aim at spotting who uses a protected invention. If they find someone,
they try to negotiate royalties. Of course, in any case, if the bargain does not yield any
result, the judiciary system can force someone to pay.
The main point here is that the producer of a new piece of knowledge can have dif-
ficulties to prevent illegal uses of her product, because of piracy for example. To model
this situation, we assume that the instantaneous payment perceived by firm qj is given by
cvqjt = ηvqjt, (12)
where 0 < η ≤ 1 represents the constant and exogenous share of the willingness to pay
to use a piece of knowledge at t that is extracted. A higher value of η means that the
problems of verification and exclusion are weaker. Taking into account (12), we examine
how the symmetric equilibrium is modified. Noting that the instantaneous price of a piece
of knowledge is now given by bvt = η(νLX + LA)/At, we get the following growth rate of
consumption and number of firms in each sector:
gc =
ηδνL− ρ
θ + (1− ν) (1− η) /ν , (13)
Q =
δL (1− ε) [θν + (1− ν) (1− η)]
ηδνL− ρ . (14)
Examination of the two previous equations leads to:
Proposition 5 : With verification and exclusion problems:
a) long-run growth is lower: ∂gc/∂η > 0;
b) the number of firms in each sector j is higher: ∂Q/∂η < 0.
The results of this proposition have an intuitive interpretation. An increase of η
means that researchers can appropriate a greater amount of willingness to pay. On the
one hand, investments in research become more profitable. Thus, firms allocate more labor
to research activities. This induces an increase of the arrival rate of pieces of knowledge,
and in turn of the economic growth rate. On the other hand, when η increases, this means
that firms need more resources in order to pay for knowledge which has a negative effect
on their number in each sector.
The above results are important because the question of over or under-investments in
research is crucial regarding long-run growth. Usually, R&D-based models predict that
we can obtain either an excessive or an insufficient allocation of resources in research
leading to an insufficient or excessive growth. This well-known result in the vertical
differentiation class of models (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991a; Aghion and Howitt,
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1992) has also been obtained by Benassy (1998) in a model “à la Romer (1990)”. On the
empirical side, the data show unambiguously that research spending are insufficient. For
instance, Jones and Williams (1998) estimate that actual investments are at least four
times below what would be socially optimal. It is generally argued that this feature is
due to some distortions: the monopolistic behavior of the producers of goods embedding
knowledge, the intertemporal spill-over effect of knowledge or the creative-destruction
effect. Interestingly, our setting allows us to give an alternative explanation in the case
of new technologies. Here, insufficient research spendings come from the public good
nature of knowledge itself and, in contrast with the standard literature, are explained
in a complete market perspective. Basically, researchers cannot appropriate the entire
amount of the surplus they create because they face problems of verification and exclusion,
an explanation which fits nicely with the real world observations in the case of new
technologies.
5 Conclusion
An evolution of intellectual property rights has taken place over the last decades following
the rise of importance in the new technology sectors: pieces of knowledge in the software
industry or biotechnology sector are now directly protected by patents. The crux of
the problem is that there is a growing discrepancy between the theoretical treatment of
knowledge in growth models and the real-world evolutions.
In this paper, we have tried to account for these evolutions. We have presented a
simple growth model in which knowledge is directly patented. To deal with the problem
of non-convexity of technologies in which knowledge is an input, we have assumed that, on
the markets for private differentiated goods, firms compete à la Cournot and earn strictly
positive profits which are used to buy knowledge. Moreover, we have assumed that pieces
of knowledge, which are perfectly substitutes, are exchanged on micro-markets which work
as perfect competitive ones. We have shown a simple way to account for the verification
and exclusion problems that go along with the public (i.e. non-rival or non-depletable)
good property of knowledge.
Beyond the question raised in this article, we think that the methodology presented
here has one more interest. From a technical point of view, the model is very simple be-
cause there are no intermediate private goods embedding knowledge. Moreover, it has the
interesting property to display only one market distortion (Cournot competition). Since
such distortion can easily be identified and removed, we can argue that our framework is
suitable to study more complex issues such as sustainable development, credit funding,
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unemployment, and others. To illustrate this argument, we can refer to Grimaud and
Rouge (2008). They develop a similar model to ours to study environmental issues. As
argued by the authors, the analysis of the effects of the pollution externality is greatly
facilitated because it does not interact with other external effects inherent to standard
R&D-based models.
6 Appendix
6.1 Problem of firm qj
From the Hamiltonian of the firm’s problem we get the following first order conditions:
∂Ht
∂Xqjt
= (LEt)
1−ε (Xjt)ε−1 −
¡
Aqjt
¢−ν
/γ + (ε− 1)Xqjt
£
(LEt)
1−ε (Xjt)
ε−2¤ = 0, (15)
∂Ht
∂LAqjt
= e−
R t
0
rudu − ξtδA
qj
t = 0, (16)
∂Ht
∂Aqjt
= e−
R t
0
rudu
h
νXqjt
¡
Aqjt
¢−ν−1
/γ − vqjt
i
+ ξtδL
A
qjt = 0, (17)
∂Ht
∂Aqjt
= vte
−
R t
0
rudu = −
•
ξt. (18)
Simple manipulation of (15) yields equation (8). Integrating (18) between t and infinity
gives
R∞
t −
•
ξsds =
R∞
t vse
−
U s
0 rududs, that yields ξt − ξ∞ = (e−
U t
0 rudu)
R∞
t vse
−
U s
t rududs.
Using the transversality condition and Aqjt > 0 for all t, we have ξ∞ = 0. Thus, using
Vt =
R∞
t vse
−
U s
t rududs, we get ξt = (e
−
U t
0 rudu)Vt. Plugging this result in (16), yields
equation (9). Similarly, (17) becomes νXqjt
¡
Aqjt
¢−ν−1
/γ− vqjt+VtδLAqjt = 0. Eliminating
Vt between this equation and (9) gives vqjt = νXqjt
¡
Aqjt
¢−ν−1
/γ+LAqjt/A
qj
t . Using (1), we
get equation (10).
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We proceed in two steps. First, we compute the main conditions that emerge at date t
on each market. Second, we characterize the steady-state equilibrium.
1) Markets conditions for a symmetric equilibrium
From Proposition 1, each firm uses the whole stock of knowledge: Aqjt = At for all qj. Thus,
we replace Aqjt by At in all equilibrium conditions. On differentiated goods markets there
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is Cournot competition and free entry in each sector j. Using (8), we get the equilibrium
quantity of each differentiated good which is produced in each sector:
Xt = LEt
½
γ (At)
ν
∙
1 +
(ε− 1)
Q
¸¾1/(1−ε)
. (19)
Using (1) we get the aggregate production function of each differentiated good:
Xt =
γ (At)
ν LX
N
. (20)
Equation (6) yields the Cournot equilibrium price of differentiated good j :
pt =
½
γ (At)
ν
∙
1 +
(ε− 1)
Q
¸¾−1
. (21)
Note that for Q = 1 (monopoly case), we get the standard result pt = 1/ (εγ (At)
ν), where
1/ (γ (At)
ν) is the marginal cost and 1/ε > 1 represents the mark-up.
The free entry condition on the markets of differentiated goods implies πqj0 = 0. Using
equations (20) and (21), this condition becomes
πqj0 =
∞R
0
[{[1 + (ε− 1) /Q]}−1 LX/NQ− L/NQ]e−
R t
0
rududt = 0. (22)
Note that with a sunk or fixed cost of entry and exit equal to zero, the spot profit of the
firms must be zero at all times. Simplifying, we thus have
∙
1 +
(ε− 1)
Q
¸−1
LX − L = 0. (23)
From (10), we get the price received for each piece of knowledge:
vt =
NX
j=1
QjX
qj=1
vqjt =
(νLX + LA)
At
. (24)
From (9), the value of a piece of knowledge at t is
Vt =
1
δAt
. (25)
From (2), the law of motion of the total stock of knowledge is given by
•
At = δLAAt. (26)
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From equation (7) and r = vt/Vt + gV , we have:
θgc + ρ+ gp = vt/Vt + gV . (27)
2) Equilibrium solution
Prices:
The prices and their growth rates follow directly from (21), (24), (25), (27).
Levels of quantities and their growth rates:
Using (24) and (25), we get vt/Vt = δνLX+δLA. Differentiating (21) and (25) with respect
to time yields gp = −νgA and gV = −gA. The aggregate technology of differentiated
goods (20) and the law of motion of knowledge (26) imply gc = gX = νgA and gA = δLA,
respectively. Therefore, using the labor constraint (5) with r = vt/Vt + gVt = θgc +
ρ + gp (see equation (27)), we get the quantities of labor devoted to the production of
differentiated goods and to research.
Number of firms, Q, that composes each sector j:
Since LX has been determined previously, we get the equilibrium value of Q by using (23).
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